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Turkish Modernization: Unity in Diversity (and Ambiguity)
~ irigitte fardot , 4/18/2010 6:50 ÖÖ
İrem Hacıalioğlu
March 2010
Modernization in Turkey response paper
TURKISH MODERNIZATION: UNITY IN DIVERSITY (AND AMBIGUITY)
In this paper, I firstly aim to briefly explain what modernization is through different approaches and by different scholars; and then I will speak of the constituents of modernization. Secondly, I will describe the reformist movements starting from the late imperial era of the Ottomans to the early republican times, looking closer to the perceptions of the society on those reforms, the ‘progress’ -as it was put- itself, and namely the modernization process. Lastly, I will try to show how the changes affected Turkey, linking ‘now’ to ‘then’. I will mostly make use of Reşat Kasaba’s work Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities; because I personally believe that the effect of modernization on Turkey can be understood at looking at dilemmas in all areas of development and that what we understand –as a country- from the values presented in the question are all hidden in those paradoxes and ambivalences.
Fundamentally, modernization refers to the transition process of a particular state from a traditional era to a modern one. Early modernists such as Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, Samuel Huntington and Lucian Pye demonstrated modernization as a linear process and they simply made a distinction between what is ‘traditional’ and what is ‘modern’ in terms of values. Almond and Verba (1963) argued that modern men and women tend to judge others by universalistic standards – to believe in the possibility and desirability of change; to think about issues outside the sphere of one’s family, neighborhood, or village; to believe that one can influence the political system.[1] Those people often equated modernism with Westernism and saw it as a process of getting developing nations to think and act more like Western. Marion Levy even stated that “The more highly societies become, the more they resemble one another.” [2] While these examples of modernization theory are not so respectably referenced today, dependency theory got its hold on explaining development and modernization. I believe that the Ottomon-Turkish modernization process cannot be explained through modernization theory and that it is more of an example of the dependency theory. I will not go into detail on this particular issue but by the end of this paper I am assuming that the reader will have grasped this idea of Turkish modernization not having certainties/absolute ideologies to follow up a certain path.
As Marshall Berman puts it, modernization refers to “generalized images which summarize the various transformations of social life attendant upon the rise of a market society and the nation-state.”[3] But Reşat Kasaba uses modernization in a little different concept, as “the freeing of individuals and communities from some of their traditional obligations, enabling them to take part in the expanding market society.” There, we can say, are three different constituents of modernization. First, growth of the market society, economy to be open up to international arena, thus newly emerging institutions, organizations and practices; second, a countermovement of protection, redefinition of institutions; and then the discourse on human rights and freedoms and their creations (again as new institutions).
During 1830s, Ottoman Empire officials realized that the empire could not maintain with the war booty anymore, and that unless they keep up with the new world order (international trade – as an outcome of a liberal economy; liberalism, technological developments), they would not survive as a whole. Thus, the Ottoman economy and markets became linked to the European markets and Ottoman Empire successfully adopted the first constituent of modernization according to the earlier sub-division in the previous paragraph. We can reference to the Balkan rebellions as protectionist countermovement. And lastly, with the edicts made in the earlier 19th Century, we could say that the Ottoman Empire demonstrated the practice of the third constituent of modernization; the discourse of human rights and freedoms.
Bernard Lewis states that after turning their backs to Asia during the Middle Ages, Turks returned to their rightful path in the 18th Century by turning to the West once again, for modeling their imperial institutions after the Western ones.[4] Although Lewis was criticized for his generalizations and his idea of equating modernism with Westernism, Reşat Kasaba makes use of his works and backs up his idea of ‘ambiguities against certainties’, making contra-arguments to Lewis’s. Kasaba picks out some statements made in Lewis’s classic, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, and he explains what I aim to demonstrate in this paper. I will return to this subject after a brief summary of the earlier reforms.
If I am to give details about the reforms, I should again touch on the need of opening up to the international market. Trade was not only in the hands of the non-Muslims and not surprisingly new kinds of laws were needed; namely the commerce laws. Bill of Alliance (1808) was signed in order for the Sultan to share his administrative power with the grand vizier. Edict of Tanzimat (1839) was introduced to the people which was guaranteeing lives and properties, equitable collection of taxes and free trial for everyone. Then came the Edict of Reform (1856) which strengthened the earlier edict and afterwards the Kanun-i Esasi (1876), the first Ottoman constitution was put forward.
These reforms led to some disparities, all because they drew the attentions of many groups within the empire and while people in a way were very keen on being ‘civilized’ and ‘advanced’ they were also promoting the usage of Sheria in their lives. Because in the Ottoman way of live, state was mostly tagged with religion as religion was also tagged with the state. They were inseparable. Thus, the perception of the people would reflect the same notion; they were dependent on each other and that even the Sultan (who was again linked with state in a ‘heavenly’ way) represented this unity within his existence. As Kasaba also puts it, people were not necessarily clear-minded about modernization and this dilemma was even in the literature of the Ottomans. [5]
In the following years, from the late imperial time to the republican era, political elites saw themselves as the most important among the people and that they felt they were the only median who can forcibly bring about a social change to whatever era they are in. They regarded the society as a ‘project’, thus the people become the objects of their experiments. A top-down process was taking hold and that the elites were thinking that the behaviors of the people could easily be molded if the environmental change takes place first. Especially the Young Turks of Ottomans and Kemalist leaders of Turkey sampled the Jacobins who were the revolutionist group in France in late 1700s. Turkish admirers of Jacobins have also put a line in between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ (as they simplify it) after they came to power. While doing these, they kind of worshipped science, and instead of seeing it as something that they should be engaged in, doing it by themselves; they regarded it as it was something that could be borrowed for specific purposes. Thus, they thought that the religious life, like moral and economic life, must also be reformed on scientific lines.
Therefore, science can be one of the sides of the approaches of Ottoman-Turkish modernism. The other would be the nation-state idea. Early Enlightenment philosophers had a broader vision in terms of progress. They thought of progress universally. But towards the end of the 19th Century, the rise of nation-state throughout Europe had elites and political leaders thinking it in a narrower concept which prevented some of the cultures from integrating to progress. People started to believe that some of the cultures cannot develop if they did not leave their identities. This also affected Turkish nationalists and while ambiguities were out of tolerance, certainties took hold. Those people wanted to create ethnically solid communities with the same patterns in terms of culture and identity. They saw the survival in an homogenous society. All in all, all these perceptions were seen as vital pieces of modernism.
Political elites excluded Islamists and non-Muslims from the progress process they were leading. Also, any other ideas or institutions rather than theirs were labeled as dangerous. They simply looked down upon other people. New textbooks were written through their perceptions of modernism and all of these were made in the name of a social engineering process.
After a matter of time, namely right after the multi-party system was established in 1946, people started to look back on their history. Especially after the 1980 military coup, institutions, cultures, beliefs and identities became questionable. The top-down process of a ‘linear’ modernization failed to go on. Thus, a social flux started. People with questions became intolerant to the ones without questions, and vice versa. Some saw questioning of all the values as reactionary, and some saw it necessary in order to live in a pluralist society.
Today, all the differences between Turks and minorities (mostly the Kurds), secularists and Islamists, rural people and urban people are still becoming more and more pronounced. Fights in terms of human rights and freedoms are taking place. Despite many views regarding them as ‘dangerous’ now, I believe that this is also a process that we need to go through. We are still living in dilemma in many areas of life, but it is clear that another top-down intervention cannot be expected as we, as individuals, should, by ourselves, carry out the changes. I am not questioning the way things were done in the past; as I did nothing but explaining why we perceive things how we perceive today – and not judging it. I just ‘see it from today’ that we do not need further interventions of any kind and I believe that we, ultimately, will be capable of living without absolute and certain ways of thinking.
[1] Gabriel Almond & Sydney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[2] Marion Levy, Jr.. 1967. “Social Patterns and Problems of Modernization” in Readings on Social Change, ed. Wilbert Moore and Robert Coole. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
[3] Berman, Marshall. 1982. All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
[4] Lewis, Bernard. 1966. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York, London: Oxford University Press.
[5] Kasaba, Reşat. 1997. “Kemalist Certanties and Modern Ambiguities” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, eds. Bozdoğan, S. and Reşat Kasaba. Seattle: University of Washington.
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